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Globally there is a shortage of organs available for transplant resulting in thousands of lives lost as a 
result. Last year in the United Kingdom (UK) 457 people died as a result of organ shortage1. NHS 
Blood and Transplant suggest national debates to test public attitudes to radical actions to increase 
organ donation should be considered in addressing organ shortage. The selling of organs for 
transplant in the UK is prohibited under the Human Tissue Act 2004. This discussion paper considers 
five ethical objections raised in the UK to paid donation, and discusses how these objections are 
managed within the only legal and regulated paid living unrelated renal donation programme in the 
world in Iran, where its kidney transplant list was eliminated within two years of its commencement.  
This paper discusses whether paid living unrelated donation in Iran increases riskier donations, and 
reduced altruistic donation as opponents of paid donation claim. The paper debates whether 
objections to paid donation based upon commodification arguments only oppose enabling financial 
ends, even if these ends enable beneficent acts. Discussions in relation to whether valid consent can 
be given by the donor will take place, and will also debate the objection that donors will be coerced 
and exploited by a paid model. This paper suggests that exploitation of the paid donor within the 
Iranian model exists within the legally permitted framework. However paid living kidney donation 
should be discussed further and other models of paid donation considered in the UK as a radical 
means of increasing donation. 
Keywords: Organ Donation, Transplantation, Kidney, Iran, Sale, Living Donation, Deceased Donation, 
Altruism, Consent. Exploitation 
 
Introduction  
 . Healthcare providers from an array of work environments are likely to encounter patients with  
end stage organ failure who could benefit from organ transplantation. Some patients however will 
not be transplanted due to a shortage of organs. Despite 126,670 organs transplanted globally in 
2015, and an increase of 5.8% in comparison to 2014,21 there is still a reported need for even more 
organ transplants to save more lives. In the UK in 2017 despite performing a record number life 
saving transplants, 457 people died whilst waiting for a lifesaving transplant. 12 Despite 
improvements in the last few years in organ donation rates in the UK as a result of the 
implementation of the Organ Donation Taskforce recommendations,3 organ shortage remains a 
problem in the UK and globally.  
. Plans to increase society’s support organ donation were addressed by the NHS Blood and 
Transplant 2020 strategy4 These strategies include the consideration of presumed consent in Wales, 
which was later enacted through The Human Transplantation (Wales) Act 2013 in 2015. 4There are 
also plans outlined for Scotland and England to follow with opt- out polices. National debates to test 
public attitudes to radical actions to increase the number of organ donors was also proposed, 
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specifically to test public attitudes to whether those on the Organ Donor Register should receive 
higher priority if they needed to be placed on the transplant list . 4 The testing of public attitudes in 
incentivising donation with priority points when signing up to be a donor, was an activity undertaken 
within Israel prior to implementing legislation to enact this incentive in Israeli law.5 There are 
however other incentives that could increase organ donation rates and are worth testing public 
support for. Three options have been suggested by Dworkin to increase the supply of available 
donors.6 These options are described as first, donation as seen within the current altruistic donation 
system within the UK, second, conscription, as seen within deemed consent policies relevant to 
deceased donation, and finally, the sale of organs.6 The aim of this discussion paper is therefore to 
explore the latter option of organ sales, as a means of increasing organ donation in the UK.  
 
Organ donation in Iran 
Whilst Iran has supported end stage kidney failure by providing renal dialysis services since 1974 
renal transplantation seldom occurred for 20 years following its emergence, and between 1967 and 
1985 only 112 related altruistic living donation (RALD) transplants were carried out in Iran. 7 This is 
said to be due to the 1979 revolution that caused Iranian assets to be frozen overseas and the Iran-
Iraq war in the 1980s,7 which virtually put a stop to transplantation for four years.8 Whilst there are 
many provinces in Iran and limited reported renal data in English, the increasing demand for renal 
transplant in Iran can be seen by noting that in the province of Tehran alone, in 1991 there were just 
587 people receiving haemodialysis, by 2006 there were 25,000 patients receiving haemodialysis .7 
During this time most transplants of Iranian citizens were from RALD and were performed in other 
countries, mostly the UK9 10 The Iranian Ministry of Health and Medical Education paid for these 
overseas transplants,8 or used imported organs from Euro-transplant Organ Sharing Network which 
were of poorer quality to meet their transplant needs.10 Unlike the UK, Iran is still only in its infancy 
in developing a deceased organ donation programme, in 2016 it still relied on living kidney donors to 
generate 43% of all kidney donors in Iran.11 Goodzari 12 highlights some of the religious challenges 
that as a Muslim country, Iran has encountered. Religious scholars permission has had an essential 
role towards considerable developments in organ and tissue donation in Iran, some believing that 
the spiritual law of organ donation as within a  fatwa, is superior to the law.  It was only in the year 
2000, that the Organ Transplant and Brain Death Act 2000 was approved by parliament in Iran to 
support the concept of neurological death legally, and enabling deceased donation following 
previous failures to enact it. 13 As a result of the increased number of patients in Iran needing 
transplants and the inadequate supply of altruistic kidney donors and long transplant waiting lists, 
thousands of patients died each year awaiting a renal transplant.141  Until 1988 all renal transplants 
performed in Iran were from unpaid RALDs, until a government funded paid and regulated 
programme known as the ‘Gift of Altruism’, ‘Rewarded Gifting’ financial incentive scheme was 
adopted for living unrelated  donors (LURDs) which eliminated the renal transplant list within a few 
years of its commencement. 8-9  15-18 
 
The current state of organ sales 
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When organ sales have been discussed, much of the focus has been on the evils of organ trafficking, 
such as human trafficking for the purpose of organ removal and organ tourism which occurs in illegal 
black markets. 19,20 Whilst organ sales can occur in many different forms, the most troubling is where 
living people have their organs stolen for cash value, or even worse, they are killed so that their 
organs can be removed and sold.21 Another form is where people volunteer to sell one of their own 
organs to satisfy their desire for money and   exercising their bodily autonomy. Regulated markets 
are argued to combat the evils associated with free and unlawful black markets, which are guilty of 
coercion, exploitation and lack of informed consent and appropriate donor care.22 
In the UK a legal prohibition of the commercialisation of human organs was enacted within the 
Human Organs Transplant Act 1989 in response to an organ sales scandal which occurred within a 
black market in 1988 at the private Humana Hospital, in London. This Act was later repealed by the 
Human Tissue Act 2004, where both statutes prohibited any commercialisation in human organs 
intended for transplant. Whilst some believe that blanket prohibitions against organ 
commercialisation as seen within UK legislation, have been applied as a safeguard against abuse, it 
uses a sledgehammer to crack a potentially valuable nut. 22 Instead, regulation of a market could 
operate to safeguard against abuse by ensuring protection of vulnerable members of society, apply 
safeguards to ensure appropriate consent is given and any potential LURDs are not coerced in to 
selling.23 By regulating and safeguarding an organ market, could open up a valuable source of life 
saving transplants  which could address the organ shortage problem. 
The main ethical objections to paid living donation were raised during the development of the 
Human Tissue Act 2004, 24 and are also acknowledged within the literature.6 22,251The several 
objections to paid living donation are (1)The body should not be treated as a means to an end 
commodity (2)The commercialisation of organs for transplant would increase risky donations 
(3)Commercialisation of organs should be prohibited because organs are non-regenerative (4)A 
trade in organs could cause harm to the vendor (5)Paid donation would reduce altruistic donations 
(6) Organ vendors would be exploited (7) Paid organ donors’ consent would be invalid due to 
coercion and financial inducement influencing mental capacity. It is worth noting however that some 
of these objections to paid donation become problematic when we compare these to the current 
policy of unpaid living donations that are currently legally permitted, but donated within an altruistic 
programme. For example living kidney donors who donate to a relative, friend or via paired and 
pooled living kidney schemes, arguably also attain some degree of harm during the surgical 
procedure, and the kidneys are still permitted to be donated even though they too are also non 
regenerative . The paper therefore will concentrate on objections (1) (2) (5) (6) (7) and seeks to 
explore how these ethical objections are managed with within the Iranian programme.  
 
 
Paid donation would reduce altruistic donations 
Altruism has long been taken to be the guiding principle in the ethics of organ donation and has 
been used for justification in allowing or rejecting certain types of donation.26  However it has been 
poorly defined in policy and position statements justifying some donations and used inconsistently 
in comparison to the philosophical literature on altruism.27 Whilst altruism in organ donation has 
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been defined by both the motivation of the donor and the action of the donation, it is suggested 
that it is the motives of the donor that is of concern to transplant authorities in determining whether 
the donation will be altruistic.28 Despite this proposal the Human Tissue Authority29, the UK based 
regulator for Human Organs, whilst permitting and referring to varying forms of altruistic donations 
in its guidance, does not define altruism within its literature. Behaviour however is often described 
as altruistic when it is motivated by a desire to benefit someone other than oneself for that person’s 
sake. It is argued  that altruistic acts however need not involve self-sacrifice to enable them to be 
altruistic, where despite some gain being attained to person receiving the act, those undertaking the 
act attain some loss.30 Instead acts and motives may remain altruistic even when they are performed 
from a mixture of motives, or of which are also self-interested.30  
In understanding why reducing altruistic donations by the introduction of paid LURD, would be so 
detrimental for social solidarity, a discussion in relation to our duties to altruism and society are 
worth considering.  A better understanding however of our role in altruism is given by Wilkinson 
21who identifies with our responsibilities in society and its association with altruism, and suggests 
there are two forms. One form is obligatory and when there is a duty to rescue, and the second form 
is when altruism is supererogatory, morally good but not morally required. 21In applying this in 
understanding of our role in altruism within organ donation per se, it can be suggested that if kidney 
donation was morally obligatory, then to demand money for a kidney or even refuse to donate 
would be wrong, but as this is supererogatory, to demand money for a kidney, may not be as good 
as giving it for free, but it wouldn’t be wrong either. 21 Paid organ donation therefore in itself is 
argued to not violate the principle of the donation being altruistic because it is supererogatory.21 It 
could also be suggested that to allow LURD donors, payment for this, could actually double altruism 
as the money used as a result of the donation could be used to help another person or a beneficent 
action. Payment for donation need not diminish altruism within a free donation system at all, people 
can still donate their kidney without payment and this could be seen as a purer form of altruism and 
attain the recognition of a greater act of beneficence. 31 There are no reasons why two renal 
donation programmes, one paid and one altruistic and unpaid, cannot exist simultaneously which 
would allow altruism to flourish.31 
Despite both an altruistic and unpaid living and deceased donation programme, and a paid LURD 
programme existing simultaneously in Iran, it appears however that even 20 years later there is still 
an emphasis on LURDs to donate to help those in need of a life changing transplant.32 Unpaid and 
altruistic deceased organ donation in Iran, unlike the UK has not been well established. Goodzari 
highlights some of the challenges that as a Muslim country, Iran has encountered in developing an 
altruistic deceased donation programme.12  Whilst reluctance to participate in altruistic deceased 
donation  has been based upon religious uncertainty requiring religious scholars’ permission, it was 
only in the year 2000, that the Organ Transplant and Brain Death Act 2000 was approved by 
parliament to support the concept of neurological death legally, following previous failures to enact 
it.13 This legislation allows legal diagnosis of death by neurological criteria which would enable an 
altruistic deceased organ donation programme to further develop. Organs for transplant other than 
kidneys during the early development of the transplant programme have remained scarce because 
there has been only a paid LURD programme for kidneys, and more recently living liver lobe 
donation.18 Other organs than kidneys, for example, the donation of hearts, required a developed 
deceased programme and without this  has resulted in many patient deaths as a result.33 However 
by the end of 2012, there were 34166 kidney (including 4436 deceased-donor) and 2021 liver 
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(including 1788 deceased-donor), 482 heart, 147 pancreas, 63 lung, and several intestine and 
multiorgan transplants performed in Iran.18 This demonstrates that altruistic deceased donations 
have increased whilst still enabling a paid donation programme to be in place. Whilst some suggest 
that since the adoption of the LURD model, the number of altruistic RALD donors have actually 
decreased, it is suggested that this is due to the elimination of coercive living related donor 
transplants occurring, now a LURD programme exists.34,35 
Whilst altruism alone has not been enough to satisfy the growing need of kidney transplants in Iran, 
it was recognised by some transplant ethicists that the prohibition of all forms of financial incentives 
to organ donors, had resulted in patients’ deaths and suffering worldwide .16 Gillon elaborates on 
the dilemma of the pursuit of only altruistic donation at the detriment of substandard health 
provisions and lives lost as a result, and states when benefits in altruism and social solidarity can be 
obtained along with the maintenance of optimal healthcare, then we can all cheer. 36However 
should the pursuit of altruism and social solidarity impair the provision of healthcare, many would 
give priority to optimal healthcare, even at the cost of more commerce and less altruism.3635 The 
introduction of a trade in kidney donors has however raised its own ethical concerns particularly in 
relation to appropriate consent and coercion of potential donors. 
 
The body should not be treated as a means to an end commodity 
Deontological theories, as within Kantian ethics determine the morality of an act being dependent 
upon its conformity to some code of laws or norms,37 whilst examples of acts deriving from 
deontology are often given as not lying, and keeping promises.  Kant's second categorical imperative 
states, Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or that of another, always as an 
end and never as a means only.38 Morelli 39 identifies the appeal for this as a moral directive being 
based upon the strong rejection of using or exploiting another person for one’s own purposes. 
Closely related to this is the directives requirement that we respect the humanity and  dignity of 
another, but also the expression it gives to the significance of respecting one’s own humanity.39 
Those arguing against this line of reasoning opposing paid donation, however do so by identifying 
that permitted unpaid altruistic donors are treated as a means to an end by enabling psychological 
and emotional benefits as a result of an unpaid donation,40,41 however being the means to a paid 
donation is inaccurately considered morally dissimilar.  
 
Beladi- Mousavi 42 identified the altruistic motivations of Related Altruistic Living Donors (RALDs) 
were due to a wish to help their relative, and this motive is also seen within other living donor 
studies.40,41 Iranian RALDs relationships became strengthened with their relative following the 
donation of a kidney. 42 It therefore must be asked how using the body to allow some ends, such as 
strengthened relationships, to be pursued are morally permissible, whereas other ends are 
considered, as payment has been, are simply abhorrent. Morelli39 explains the moral objection is not 
giving up the body part, but the body part for monetary gain rather than a beneficent purpose. 
Beneficent purposes however have found to coexist in addition to payment in a study which 
examined paid LURDs motives. 43Thirty-seven  per cent of 600 LURD’s identified their motive for 
donating was financial, however 60% of motives were altruistic, emotional and financial.43 The 
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finances were used to fund variable beneficent actions such as medical costs  to aid family in need of 
hospitalization, to maintain family reputation, solve personal problems, to pay back a debt, and to 
be exempted from the military service.43  Examples of beneficent motives for payment have also 
emerged within the UK, with finances proposed to fund  a child’s cerebral palsy treatment.44 
 
Paid organ donors consent would be invalid due to coercion and financial inducement influencing 
mental capacity 
Ethical principles concerned with valid and appropriate consent in adults is well established in 
healthcare law internationally and embedded in both common law, and statute within the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005 in England and Wales. Valid consent must be given freely, without coercion, the 
person giving consent must have the mental capacity to do so, and the person giving consent must 
have been adequately informed about what they are giving consent to.45  Two objections to 
commercialisation against kidney sales are based upon the suggestion that consent cannot be given 
by the vendor freely because they are coerced by their circumstances, and that prospective organ 
vendors are induced by the monetary element involved in the transaction.25,46 Despite these 
objections informed consent however is suggested within the literature to be taken from the LURD, 
their next of kin, and donor identity is confirmed upon presentation of a national identity card in an 
attempt to prevent organ tourism and trafficking, a risk with any paid model. 47 
It can be quite hard for people to resist the offer of a large sum of money although in healthcare we 
do not normally consider a monetary element when taking consent from individuals48 There are 
however many examples of healthcare where by individuals consent to do things involving money 
and their capacity to consent is not questioned because money is involved. Examples of these are 
when people agree and consent to going to work for money, and agree to buy or receive large sums 
of money when buying or selling property.48  Bagheri 13 in favour of paid donation argues that kidney 
donors should be rightfully compensated, since everyone participating in the organ donation, the 
transplant surgeons, nurses, anaesthetists are all paid for their work, except for the donor. 
Determining the right amount of payment to be given to the donor appears vital in the debate 
exploring the ethical permissibility of financial incentive, too high a figure being considered too 
persuasive, but too little is exploiting. Despite dialysis costs in Iran estimated at an average annual 
cost of $11549,49 and a transplanted kidney functioning in 75% of recipients at  5 years post 
transplant, 34 the costs saved on haemodialysis as a result of transplantation is profitable. The Iranian 
system despite this is cited to pay donors the equivalent of $1200 USD as a reward from the 
Government following their kidney donation, and is not enough to satisfy the majority of kidney 
donors requiring recipients to provide additional monetary rewarded gifts to the donors in an 
attempt to prevent exploitation.9If the recipient is poor then charitable organisations are stated to 
provide this top up payment.9 
A further objection to organ sales is based upon the argument that poverty would coerce the donor 
in to selling their kidney.17 Whilst coercion often results in exploitation and involves a technique that 
agents (coercers) use to get other agents (coerces) to do or not do something, and is typically 
thought to carry with it several important implications, in that  it diminishes the targeted agent's 
freedom and responsibility, and that it is a violation of rights.50 In arguing against this objection 
against commercialisation Wilkinson 21 suggests that it is only agents who can threaten and coerce 
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people, and although you could be threatened with poverty if you did not undertake an act that 
would alleviate poverty, poverty in itself cannot threaten a person. If we remove poor people out of 
the equation, and allow only the rich to sell their organs then this argument should vanish, but it 
does not.21 In exploring the social class of LURD’s in Iran it is evident that LURD donors have been of 
different social classes, it is not just the poor who have volunteered to donate within the paid 
model,42 in fact some of the most vulnerable members of society, refugees, are treated with dialysis 
facilities within Iran but are not permitted to donate within the paid model to prevent organ 
trafficking.10,15 
Organ vendors would be exploited 
Exploitation is to take unfair advantage of another person, 51 and to use another person’s 
vulnerability for one’s own benefit, and can be transactional or structural in its origins.52 Objections 
to exploitation are rooted in principles of  justice and fairness , and can occur due to a failure of an 
agreement in reciprocity., I may for example obtain benefits from another person but do not pay 
them for this benefit when I agreed to do so.53 The Iranian model attempts to prevent reciprocal 
exploitation of the donor and recipient, by once they are matched  requiring the donor to signs a 
pledge,  stating that the donor will not claim any monetary reward from the recipient during the 
laboratory tests and until after transplantation.13 The recipient also signs a pledge not to compensate 
the kidney donor directly during this timeframe, 43therefore preventing either donor or recipient 
revising or amending the agreement with requests for extra monetary compensation, or not 
donating the kidney following early payment. However in reality this form of exploitation appears to 
be evident. In a study by Zargooshi54 refusal to realize preoperative promises to 51% of LURDs was 
evident. However in addition to the Rawlsian explanation of exploitation, exploitation can also occur 
when we turn to another’s disadvantage to our advantage , using unequal bargaining power, that 
enables us to economically exploit others 53. Goodin 53 identifies four  characteristics of exploitative 
relationships being (1) The relationship embodies an asymmetrical balance of power (2) The 
subordinate party needs the resources provided by the relationship  to protect their vital interests 
(3) For the subordinate party, the relationship is the only source of such resources (4) The 
superordinate party in the relationship exercises discretionary control over those resources. In 
exploring this further within the Iranian model it is evident that this model, endorsed by the Iranian 
government exhibits the 4th characteristic of Goodin’s53 proposition. Whilst it is alleged that since 
the compensation package in Iran is a fixed sum, donors have no opportunity to claim higher 
compensation for better Human Leucocyte Antigen (HLA) matching of donor and recipient,7 which 
would enable better kidney transplantation, or higher payment for rare blood types which would 
reduce the waiting time for kidney transplant for those with rare blood groups. These in contrast 
however have been reported to occur.55,56On reviewing the literature this is possible for this to take 
place within the additional rewards given by the recipient at unsupervised meetings within the 
Dialysis and Patient Transplant Association (DAPTA) premises. 7,9 
The commercialisation of organs for transplant would increase risky donations 
Objections to the commercialisation of human organs and tissues on the basis of this increasing the 
risk of donations, based their arguments upon the adverse effects of the paid blood donation system 
in the United States (US) in the 1970’s-1980’s, which resulted in contaminated blood products and 
infection of Hepatitis C and HIV in to thousands of people receiving blood transfusions in the US. 
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However more recently the UK whom also purchased blood products from the US during this time 
are now recognising that as many as 25,000 people in the UK have been infected with contaminated 
blood products from the US.57 In 1970, it was estimated  that up to one-third of U.S. blood centres 
depended on paid donors,58 which recruited higher risk donors who were drug addicts and prisoners, 
often giving fictitious names and addresses to sell  their blood to different blood banks.58 Paid blood 
donors were also recognised to falsify their medical history in order to get paid for the donation due 
to the incentives that drove this,58 as a result the United States now operates an unpaid approach to 
blood donation which is much tightly regulated and operated than that of the 1970’s-1980’s. The 
Iranian model addresses the ethical objection of paid donation causing risky donations by ensuring a 
complete medical and psychological check of the potential donor and recipient before donation and 
transplantation which is suggested to be in line with internationally agreed standards for care of the 
living donor. 9 It is suggested that this practice also rules out the possibility of persons with poor 
organs trying to cover up medical problems to participate in the programme,35 which was an issue 
seen within a paid blood donation system in the United States.59 Transplant recipients are also 
eligible for government provided medical insurance and come under the category of ‘Patient with 
Special Diseases’, this allows them to obtain immunosuppression drugs at no, or a subsidised cost.9 
In an attempt to reduce harm to the unrelated, living kidney donor, it is reported that they receive a 
year of health insurance and follow up care to enable them to recover.9, It is however recognised 
that this is not regularly done and should be better organised.60 
Conclusion 
Whilst the Iranian model is not without its moral objections, there have been other proposals of paid 
donation models within the literature which address how an ethical paid and regulated living 
donation programme may exist.61-64.Whilst many people will continue to oppose kidney sales 
regardless of the arguments offered and will feel that it is simply repugnant, we should not let this 
feeling of repugnance hold hostage to our moral thinking, for a great many things that we now hold 
in the highest esteem, including organ transplantation itself, occasioned strong repugnance in the 
past .65If we are going to deny treatment to the suffering and dying who need a transplant, which 
could be available through a paid and regulated donation programme, then we need better reasons 
than our own feelings of disgust if we are to continue to deny those awaiting a transplant, and those 
willing to sell, this opportunity.66  
This paper has explored some of the ethical objections to paid donation raised during the 
development of the Human Tissue Act 2004, which outlaws the selling of organs for transplant 
within the UK. These objections have been discussed further within the context of the only legally 
permitted and regulated compensated living unrelated kidney donor model as adopted in Iran in 
1988 in understanding some of the arguments within the paid donation debate.  The paper has 
found that a regulated market for living kidney donors should not be completely disregarded and 
further discussion and testing of public support for such an initiative could help to address the UK 
organ shortage.  
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